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Choice-of-law provisions have the devastating potential of 
bypassing state statutes implemented to protect the general public and 
undermining the legislative intent of a state.  A choice-of-law clause is 
a provision in a contract where the parties choose a state’s law to 
govern any conflicts or disputes that may arise between the parties.1  
Lenders may implement choice-of-law clauses in their contracts to 
avoid statutes or regulations of various states.2  Many lenders use 
choice-of-law provisions to avoid New York laws and regulations 
intentionally.  Additionally, inconsistencies and misinterpretations of 
New York law by the federal and state courts have led to forum 
shopping to exploit loopholes and bypass implications of violating 
New York law.  Lenders attempt to avoid New York’s criminal usury 
statutes through choice-of-law clauses.  A lender commits usury when 
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completion of this Note. Additionally, thank you to Editor-in-Chief, Nicholas Maggio, and 
Managing Editor, Olivia Lattanza, for their continued guidance and support throughout the 
writing and editing process of this Note. Lastly, many thanks to my Notes Editor, Robert 
Molinari, Jr., for overseeing my note in its early stages, and providing me with encouragement 
and support throughout the writing and editing process. 
1 Glen Banks, New York Practice Series: New York Contract Law § 8:3 (2019). 
2 William B. Emmal, comment, Evading Prohibitions on Usury Through Choice of Law, 9 
TRANSLAW 6 (2009).  Emmal stated, “[s]ome lenders might also use a choice-of-law clause 
to avoid the usury law of the state whose law would apply if no choice were made.”  Id. 
1
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the lender charges an illegal rate of interest on a financial instrument.3  
Thus, many lenders intentionally try to avoid New York’s criminal 
usury statutes through the use of choice-of-law provisions or forum 
shopping.  
When a transaction is executed in New York between two 
businesses, New York law should govern if the transaction is 
substantially related to New York.4  Additionally, when two parties 
execute a transaction, one of the parties being in New York, and 
fundamental public policy would be violated by enforcing a choice-of-
law provision.5  New York law should govern the transaction.6  
Part II will provide a brief history of usury in New York.  Part 
III will analyze the various usury statutes of New York.  This section 
will also discuss how businesses may invoke criminal usury as an 
affirmative defense, the required percentage threshold for a borrower 
to invoke criminal usury in New York, and the various financial 
instruments that the courts may deem as criminally usurious in New 
York.  Part IV will discuss how the courts calculate interest on 
financial instruments in New York.  Part V will delve into the intent of 
predatory businesses and explain why these businesses choose certain 
states to govern their contracts.  Part VI will discuss New York’s 
substantial relationship test and how it impacts choice-of-law 
provisions.  Part VII will examine New York’s fundamental public 
policy and how it may supersede choice-of-law provisions.  Part VIII 
will examine the ramifications of criminally usurious transactions and 
how these transactions are void in New York.  Part IX will shed light 
on the ambiguous nexus between criminally usurious transactions and 
waivers.  Part X will delve into inconsistencies in rulings between the 
federal and state courts’ interpretation of New York’s usury laws, 
which ultimately leads to forum shopping.  Finally, Part XI will 
conclude by discussing how the criminal usury laws should be 
interpreted by all of the courts in New York when there is a choice-of-
law provision in dispute.  The final section will reevaluate the usury 
statutes and clarify the statutory language of criminal and civil usury, 
 
3 75 Am. Jur. 3d. Proof of Facts § 103 (2019). 
4 19A N.Y. Jur. 2d Conflict of Laws § 34 (2019).  A choice-of-law provision will not be 
enforced or honored if the law chosen has no reasonable relationship or sufficient contacts 
with the transaction or subject matter of the contract in question.  Id. 
5 19A N.Y. Jur. 2d Conflict of Laws § 35 (2019).  A choice-of-law provision will not be 
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which will bring the federal and state decisions concerning criminal 
usury into harmony. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF USURY IN NEW YORK 
Since their founding, the courts in New York have taken a 
strong position against enforcing loans with a rate of interest above 
what is permitted by law.7  Amidst establishing the foundation of 
interest limitations on financial instruments, “the ‘Statute of Anne’ 
(1713), which fixed a maximum rate of interest at five percent for all 
loans, was the model followed.”8  In 1773, the Parliament of Great 
Britain passed the Statute of Anne to reduce the rate of interest on a 
loan without any prejudice to any Parliamentary Securities.9  To 
combat the inherent issues that are faced when parties with disparate 
bargaining power enter into contractual agreements, the legislature of 
New York enacted its first usury statute in 1787.10 
In New York State, the leading case regarding usurious 
transactions is Curtiss v. Teller,11 in which the New York Court of 
Appeals held that usury statutes declare a usurious transaction void and 
provide for forfeitures and penalties against the usurer.12  The decision 
and reasoning of the Curtiss Court were sustained nearly seventy years 
later in Szerdahelyi v. Harris.13  The Court of Appeals in Szerdahelyi 
analyzed the history surrounding usury laws and noted that the 
interpretation of the usury statutes in Curtiss is consistent with New 
York’s legislative view on the matter.14  In early judicial decisions, 
there was no legislation in effect to bifurcate usury into civil usury and 
criminal usury. 
Further, the court held that a usurious transaction is void ab 
initio, and a financial instrument with a total interest charge exceeding 
the statutory limit results in the lender being unable to recoup the 
 
7 Franklin W. Ryan, Usury and Usury Laws: A Juristic-Economic Study of the Effects of 
State Statutory Maximums for Loan Charges upon Lending Operations in the United States, 
Vol. 39, Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1924, at 181. 
8 Id. 
9 Public Act, 13 Anne., c. 15 (Gr. Brit. 1773)  
10 An Act for preventing Usury (Feb. 8, 1787), Reprinted in Laws of the State of New York, 
Revised and Passed at the Thirty-Sixth Session of the Legislature, Volume 1. 
11 112 N.E. 1056 (N.Y. 1916). 
12 Id. 
13 Szerdahelyi v. Harris, 490 N.E.2d 517 (N.Y. 1986). 
14 Id.  
3
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money that he or she has advanced.15  Additionally, if a lender’s total 
interest charge exceeds the statutory limit, the lender cannot collect the 
interest due on the transaction.16  At the time Szerdahelyi was being 
heard, the New York State legislature made further revisions to the 
usury laws due to the evolving complexity of financial crimes such as 
loan-sharking.17  The courts in New York have described loan-
sharking as “one of the most heinous, virtually bloodsucking criminal 
activities of all times.”18  The Legislature in New York subsequently 
enacted comprehensive legislation to deal with this problem.  The 
express intent of this legislation was to “amend the penal law and the 
general obligations law, concerning criminal usury and possession of 
records of a criminally usurious loan.”19  Usurious transactions are 
ultimately void under New York law, regardless of whether they 
violate the civil section of Statute 5-501 or the criminal section under 
the New York Penal Law Section 190.40.20  
The current usury laws in New York are some of the strongest 
and most exceptional in the nation, reflecting the principles adopted by 
New York that go back to Lord Mansfield from the Kings High Court 
in England, in the mid-to-late 1700s.21  The New York Court of 
Appeals was keenly aware of the issues arising from creative predatory 
lenders more than 144 years ago and stated:  
The shifts and devices of usurers to evade the statutes 
against usury, have taken every shape and form that the 
wit of man could devise, but none have been allowed to 
prevail. Courts have been astute in getting at the true 




17 Id.  
18 Hammelburger v. Foursome Inn Corp., 437 N.Y.S.2d 356, 360 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 
1980). 
19 Szerdahelyi, 490 N.E.2d 517 (N.Y. 1986). 
20 See generally Bakhash v. Winston, 19 N.Y.S.3d 887 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2015); 
Fareri v. Rain’s Int’l, Ltd., 589 N.Y.S.2d 579 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1992); Abir v. Malky, 
Inc., 873 N.Y.S.2d 350 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2009); Russkaya Reklama, Inc. v. Milman, 
9 N.Y.S.3d 759 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. App. Term 2015) (holding in all these cases that the usurious 
transactions are void as a matter of law). 
21 Quackenbos v. Sayer 62 N.Y. 344, 346 (N.Y. 1875) (“The most usual form of usury was 
a pretended sale of goods.”).  Id. 
22 Id. 
4
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The courts have acknowledged that the intent of lenders may 
be latently sinister, and that usury may not be immediately apparent on 
the face of a transaction.  
Today, however, nearly 144 years later, private lenders 
continue to prevail in using complex financial instruments that 
disguise hidden fees, penalties, and rates on financial instruments to 
bypass the court and extract a rate of interest that is more than New 
York’s criminal usury statute.  While complicated loan structures and 
ambiguous language are apparent in today’s business transactions, at 
the end of the day, a simple basic analysis premised on legal principles 
that have existed for centuries will result in a finding of a usurious 
transaction from which there is no recovery at all available to the 
creditor.23 
III. NEW YORK USURY STATUTES 
New York bifurcated usury, and now a claim of usury may be 
either civil usury or criminal usury.24  General Obligation Law and 
Penal Law contain usury statutes.25  New York has enacted multiple 
statutes reflecting a view of the heinous nature of usury.26  According 
to the New York Penal Law:  
A person is guilty of criminal usury in the second 
degree when, not being authorized or permitted by law 
to do so, he knowingly charges, takes or receives any 
money or other property as interest on the loan or 
forbearance of any money or other property, at a rate 
exceeding twenty-five per centum per annum or the 
equivalent rate for a longer or shorter period.27   
Further, “criminal usury in the second degree is a class E 
felony.”28  In the event of a criminally usurious interest rate, the statute 
estops the usurer from receiving interest on a loan.29   
 
23 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-511 (McKinney 2019). 
24 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501 (McKinney 2019). 
25 See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.40 (McKinney 2019). 
26 Id. 
27 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.40. 
28 Id. 
29 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501(4).  “Interest shall not be charged, taken, or received on 
any loan or forbearance at a rate exceeding such rate of interest as may be authorized by law 
at the time the loan or forbearance is made.”  Id. 
5
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New York prohibits corporations from interposing the defense 
of civil usury to a contract.30  Only individuals may use civil usury as 
an affirmative defense to a contract or in a plenary action.31  Civil usury 
in New York exists when the total interest on a financial instrument 
exceeds a rate of sixteen percent per annum.32  In New York, only 
individuals may use civil usury as an affirmative defense to a 
contract.33  At first blush, it appears New York bars corporate 
borrowers from claiming criminal usury as an affirmative defense in 
New York.  Nonetheless, while corporations cannot plead civil usury 
as a defense to a contract, corporations may plead criminal usury as an 
affirmative defense to a contract.34  There is no legislative difference 
between what is called “civil” usury and “criminal” usury when it 
comes to New York’s General Obligation Law Statute 5-511, effective 
2006.35  However, usury is usury, and the Legislature saw fit to make 
two “levels” of usury in response to growing loan-sharking in the state, 
one that exceeds sixteen percent (civil), and the other that exceeds 
twenty-five percent (criminal).36  
When a New York court finds that a financial instrument is 
criminally usurious, the borrower may recover all interest payments or 
deliveries that were above the twenty-five percent threshold.37  The 
Southern District of New York reinforced this remedy in Carlone v. 





33 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-521(3) (McKinney 2019).  “(3) The provisions of subdivision 
one of this section shall not apply to any action in which a corporation interposes a defense of 
criminal usury as described in section 190.40 of the penal law.”  Id. 
34 Id. 
35 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-511. 
36 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501.  On a note, the civil usury threshold is an interest rate in 
the excess of sixteen percent, whereas the criminal usury threshold on a note is an interest rate 
in the excess of twenty-five percent.  Id. 
37 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-513.  
Every person who, for any such loan or forbearance, shall pay or deliver 
any greater sum or value than is allowed to be received pursuant to section 
5-501, and his personal representatives, may recover in an action against 
the person who shall have taken or received the same, and his personal 
representatives, the amount of the money so paid or value delivered, above 
the rate aforesaid.   
Id. 
38 861 F. Supp. 2d 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
6
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could recover any interest payments made in excess of the legal rate of 
twenty-five percent.39 
New York’s General Obligation Law Statute 5-501, effective 
2011, caps the maximum amount upon which to assert a claim under 
Section 190.40 at $2,500,000.00.40  The plain language of Section 
190.40, as read with Statute 5-501, states that anything below 
$2,500,000.00 is subject to criminal usury, and once found, voids the 
transaction.41  Capping the maximum amount to $2,500,000.00 to 
make a financial instrument subject to the criminal usury statutes was 
intended to solve the usury problem in New York regarding substantial 
commercial loans.42  However, the cap is now a significant reason why 
multistate loan transactions are designated to be governed by New 
York law.43  The $2,500,000.00 limitation on the statute was upheld in 
2009 by the New York Appellate Division.44  Ultimately, the financial 
instruments subject to the criminal usury statutes of New York include 
bonds, bills, notes (both demand and promissory), assurances, and 
conveyances.45    
Hence, in New York, a financial instrument is deemed void, 
and therefore, a contract between corporations is considered invalid as 
a matter of law when the lender charges a total interest on a financial 
instrument that exceeds the statutory limits.46  
All bonds, bills, notes, assurances, conveyances, all 
other contracts or securities whatsoever . . . whereupon 
or whereby there shall be reserved or taken, or secured 
or agreed to be reserved or taken, any greater sum, or 
greater value, for the loan or forbearance of any money, 
goods or other things in action, than is prescribed in 
section 5-501, shall be void . . . . 47   
 
39 Id. at 324. 
40 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501. 
41 Id. 
42 Joshua Stein, Confusury Unraveled: New York Lenders Face Usury Risks In Atypical Or 
Small Transactions, N.Y. St. B.J. 25, at 28 (August 2001). 
43 Id. 
44 Shasho v. Pruco Life Ins. Co. of N.J., 888 N.Y.S.2d 557 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2009) 
(holding that the statute providing the laws regulating the maximum rate of interest did not 
apply to loans or forbearances of $2,500,000 or more). 
45 NY GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501. 
46 Id. 
47 Id.  
7
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Thus, if a court deems a contract involving one of these 
financial instruments to be criminally usurious in New York, the 
contract is deemed to be void as a matter of law.48  
IV. CALCULATING THE TOTAL INTEREST CHARGE ON 
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS IN NEW YORK 
New York’s usury statutes are unambiguous on what is 
considered in calculating the interest on a financial instrument.  The 
plain meaning of the statute and case law in New York dictate that 
interest charges include the amount on reserve to a creditor or a lender 
at the time of the execution of a financial instrument.49  The analysis 
focuses only on the time a financial instrument is executed under the 
General Obligation Law Statute 5-501, and not on what the usurer 
ultimately collects.  
Interest rates on a financial instrument are the leading figures 
in determining if a transaction is criminally usurious.50  An interest rate 
is “the percentage that a borrower of money must pay to the lender in 
return for the use of money . . .  expressed as a percentage of the 
principal payable . . . .”51  An illegal rate of interest is “an interest rate 
higher than the rate allowed by law.52  The usury statutes of New York 
suggest that when determining if a transaction is criminally usurious, 
a proper analysis of hidden interest rates, including default rates, must 
be undertaken.53  The New York Court of Appeals held that interest 
includes not only the interest rate charged in the note but also various 
other fees, including loan “origination fees” paid by the borrower or 
deducted from the loan proceeds.54  The courts should consider 
additional fees and hidden interest on a financial instrument in 
determining if a transaction is criminally usurious.55  These additional 





51 Interest Rate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
52 Id. 
53 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501. 
54 People v. Central Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n of Nassau County, 385 N.E.2d 555 
(N.Y. 1978).  
55 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501. 
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prepayment penalties, stock options and exercising warrants, and 
default penalties.56 
Prepayment penalty provisions surrounding a financial 
instrument may be considered interest in calculating the total interest 
charged to determine if a financial instrument is criminally usurious.57  
A prepayment penalty is the right of a lender to refuse any early tender 
towards an obligation by the borrower or to exact a fee or premium 
upon the borrower in the event of payment towards an obligation that 
is earlier than what the parties expressed and outlined within a 
contract.58  The courts consider a prepayment penalty when the penalty 
brings the total interest computed on a financial instrument above the 
maximum lawful rate of twenty-five percent.59  Conversely, if a 
prepayment penalty provision does not raise the total interest charged 
above the twenty-five percent threshold, then the prepayment 
provision does not, by itself, render the financial instrument criminally 
usurious.60 
The courts must consider stock options and exercising warrants 
on a financial instrument in calculating the total interest to determine 
if a financial instrument is criminally usurious.61  Convertible notes are 
hybrid financial instruments containing both unsecured debt and an 
option component with its discrete value.62  The courts also consider 
the value of stock options in calculating the effective interest on a 
financial instrument.63  Further, the value of a common stock given to 
a lender is critical in calculating the total interest charged on a financial 
instrument.64  The underlying reasoning for these decisions is that a 
 
56 Id. 
57 Alan J. Jacobs, J.D., Rachel M. Kane, M.A., and Kimberly C. Simmons, J.D., 72 N.Y. 
Jur. 2d Interest and Usury § 101 (August 2019). 
58 Robert K. Baldwin, Prepayment Penalties: A Survey and Suggestion, 40 VAND. L. REV. 
409, 411 (1987). 
59 Id. 
60 Id.  
61 Hillair Capital Invs., L.P. v. Integrated Freight Corp., 963 F. Supp. 2d 336, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013). 
62 In re Bridge Info. Sys., 311 B.R. 781, 793 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2004) (holding that the 
unsecured debt component and option in convertible notes have discrete values, and therefore, 
should be valued separately). 
63 Hillair Capital Invs., L.P. v. Integrated Freight Corp., 963 F. Supp. 2d at 341 (holding 
that the value of a stock option is critical in calculating and evaluating the true amount of a 
financial instrument and the effective interest rate being charged). 
64 Sabella v. Scantek Med., Inc., No. 08 Civ. 453 (CM)(HBP), 2009 WL 3233703, at *1, 
*21-22 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 21, 2009) (ruling that the value of common stock given to a lender 
should be taken into account when calculating interest rates). 
9
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borrower issuing stock is agreeing to give something up for value to 
the lender.65  In New York, a financial instrument is usurious when a 
creditor is entitled to the principal balance along with a legal rate of 
interest plus additional payments that are contingent on an event that 
is out of the borrower’s control.66  Warrants on a financial instrument 
are equivalent to options, and the courts should treat the valuation of 
warrants as an original issue discount (OID).67  Thus, the courts should 
consider warrants in calculating the total interest on a financial 
instrument.68 
In New York, the courts must consider a default penalty and a 
default interest on a financial instrument in calculating the total interest 
to determine if a financial instrument is criminally usurious.  
Generally, financial instruments contain default provisions, which act 
as a penalty to deter a breach of contract.69  The default interest is 
usually a higher interest rate than the effective interest appearing on 
the face of a financial instrument.70  Historically in New York, a 
default penalty and default interest were not considered an interest in 
the calculation on total interest charged relating to criminal usury.71  
However, as of 2017, New York began considering default provisions 
on a financial instrument in the calculation of the total interest charged 
on an instrument.72  If a default provision within a financial instrument 
brings the total interest charged over the twenty-five percent threshold 
of New York, then the default provision is considered to determine if 
the financial instrument is criminally usurious.73 
 
65 In re Bridge Info. Sys, 311 B.R. at 791 (noting that possible proceeds from the sale of a 
stock option to a third party are an “opportunity cost”).  
66 Phlo Corp. v. Stevens, No. 00 Civ. 3619(DC), 2001 WL 1313387, at *1, *5 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 25, 2001) (noting that a contingent right to a bonus is something of value, and that this 
value must be added to the maximum interest charged in excess of the legal rate).  
67 Custom Chrome, Inc. v. Commissioner, 217 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that 
the original issue discount is the difference between the redemption price at maturity and issue 
price, and therefore, a type of interest). 
68 Id. 
69 American Law Reports, Validity and effect of anticipatory provision in contract in 
relation to rate of interest in the event of default, 12 A.L.R. 367 (1921). 
70 Id. 
71 Kraus v. Mendelsohn, 948 N.Y.S.2d 119, 121 (ruling that the defense of usury did not 
apply where a promissory note at issue imposed a rate in excess of the statutory maximum 
only after the note’s default or maturity). 
72 Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC., 237 F.Supp.3d 130, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (holding 
that the criminal usury cap setting the maximum interest rate of twenty-five percent does apply 
to default obligations). 
73 Id. 
10
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V. THE INTENT OF PREDATORY BUSINESSES 
The four corners of a financial instrument can display a 
lender’s usurious intent.74  Furthermore, as a matter of law, a court can 
find a lender’s usurious intent.75  Intent is a critical element in a usury 
analysis.76  When a lender of a financial instrument charges an interest 
rate above twenty-five percent, the statutory rate, it is immaterial 
whether the lender had explicit intent.77  In a situation such as this, a 
court finds the lender’s intent implied even though a lender had no 
actual intent to violate the usury laws.78  New York courts have 
consistently ruled that when usury is determined to exist, the intent is 
implied.79   
The court in In re Rosner noted that when usurious intent is not 
found on the face of the financial instrument, usury becomes a disputed 
question of material fact.80  Nonetheless, the conversion discount 
option and the default remedies expressly stated in the contract of the 
financial instrument set the total interest charge of the financial 
instrument above twenty-five percent.81  Therefore, in In re Rosner, 
the plaintiff established the defendant’s intent to charge a usurious rate 
of interest.82   
A person who comes to court with unclean hands is not 
afforded any equitable remedies.83  When it comes to criminal usury, 
intent to charge a criminally usurious rate is implied based on the face 
 
74 Blue Wolf Capital Fund II, L.P. v. Am. Stevedoring Inc., 961 N.Y.S.2d 86 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1st Dep’t 2013) (holding that if usury can be gleaned from the face of an instrument, 
intent will be implied, and usury will be found as a matter of law). 
75 Id.  
76 N.Y. BANKING LAW § 380-E (McKinney 2019). 
77 Fareri v. Rain’s Int’l, Ltd., 589 N.Y.S.2d 579 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1992) (holding 
that a transaction and supporting documents were void as a matter of law because as stipulated 
by the parties, the agreement was usurious on its face, and therefore, usurious intent can be 
inferred). 
78 Id. 
79 See generally Venables v. Sagona, 925 N.Y.S.2d 578 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2011); 
Abir v. Malky, Inc., 873 N.Y.S.2d 350 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2009) (noting that all 
usurious agreements will be void and unenforceable as a matter of law). 
80 48 B.R. 538, 548. (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985). 
81 Id.  
82 Id. 
83 Blue Wolf Capital Fund II, L.P. v. Am. Stevedoring Inc., 961 N.Y.S.2d 86 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1st Dep’t 2013). (holding that lenders found to be charging criminally usurious rates of 
interest on a financial instrument are not entitled to equitable relief).  
11
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of a financial instrument, indicating wrongdoing.84  Regarding 
financial recovery for creditors or lenders surrounding a financial 
instrument,  the courts apply “the equitable maxim that he who comes 
into equity must come with clean hands.”85   
The consequences to the lender of a usurious 
transaction can be harsh: the borrower is relieved of all 
further payment—not only interest but also outstanding 
principal, and any mortgages securing payment are 
[cancelled]. In effect, the borrower can simply keep the 
borrowed funds and walk away from the agreement. 
Moreover, the borrower can recover any interest 
payments made in excess of the legal rate (General 
Obligations Law § 5-513).  New York usury laws 
historically have been severe in comparison to the 
majority of states . . . reflecting the view of our 
Legislature that the prescribed consequences are 
necessary to deter the evils of usury.86  
Thus, a New York court will deny equitable relief to a lender 
when a lender attempting to recover demonstrates egregious conduct, 
such as fraud, unconscionability, or bad faith.87 
To evade New York laws, lenders use choice-of-law provisions 
in a contract to avoid a state’s criminal usury statutes.88  However, a 
court can find a contract between parties invalid if the lender (or party) 
used the contract as a cloak for usury.89  If a contracting party uses a 
choice-of-law provision to select a state that has no substantial 
connection with the contract—to avoid an involving state’s criminal 
usury statues—then a court can invalidate the contract.90 
 
84 Id. 
85 Lia v. Saporito, 909 F. Supp. 2d 149, 173 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that a party seeking 
equitable relief must not have unclean hands). 
86 Seidel v. 18 E. 17th St. Owners, Inc., 598 N.E.2d 7 (N.Y. 1992). 
87 Balaber-Strauss v. Murphy, 331 B.R. 107, 135 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that 
equitable relief may be denied where a party applying for such relief is guilty of conduct 
involving fraud, unconscionability, or bad faith related to the matter at issue). 
88 William B. Emmal, Evading Prohibitions on Usury Through Choice of Law (August 
2009). 
89 Cecily Fuhr, J.D., CJS INTEREST § 188 (2019). “The parties’ choice of law will be held 
to constitute a sham or subterfuge when the contacts between the transaction and the chosen 
state are not reasonably related or when the contracts themselves are contrived in order to 
substantiate the parties’ choice of law.” 
90 Id. 
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VI. NEW YORK’S SUBSTANTIAL RELATIONSHIP APPROACH AND 
THE APPLICABILITY OF CHOICE-OF-LAW PROVISIONS 
Commonly, a choice-of-law provision in a contract between 
parties is effective and lawful if: “(1) the law of the selected 
jurisdiction has a reasonable relationship to an agreement; and (2) the 
chosen law does not violate a fundamental public policy of New 
York.”91  If a court deems a contract between two parties as usurious 
under the general usury statutes of all states to which it has a substantial 
relationship, then the forum will “apply the usury statute of that state 
that imposes the lightest penalty.” 92  Under New York’s current 
choice-of-law rule, known as the center of gravity approach, a court 
will apply the law of the state that has the most significant contacts 
with the matter in dispute.93   
The Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that to ensure 
that the choice-of-law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair, the 
choice-of-law must be from a state that has significant contacts with 
the parties and the occurrence or transaction in question.94  Although 
New York recognizes that “the choice of law principle that parties to a 
contract have a right to choose the law to be applied in their contract, 
this freedom of choice on the part of the parties is not absolute.”95  To 
determine the appropriateness of the parties’ choice-of-law, New York 
follows the “substantial relationship” approach, as stated in 
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law Section 187:(2): 
The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their 
contractual rights and duties will be applied, even if the 
particular issue is one which the parties could not have 
resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement 
directed to that issue, unless either . . . the chosen state 
has no substantial relationship to the parties or the 
transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the 
parties’ choice, or . . . application of the law of the 
 
91 Glen Banks, New York Practice Series: New York Contract Law § 8:5 (2019). 
92 72 N.Y. Jur. 2d Interest and Usury § 57 (2019). 
93 Id.  
94 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308-09 (1981) (holding that applying a choice 
of law from a state with a mere slight and casual relationship to the parties and transaction 
would be fundamentally unfair to a state with a greater relationship to the parties or the 
transaction in question). 
95 S. Leo Harmony, Inc. v. Binks Mfg. Co., 597 F. Supp. 1014, 1025 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
13
Basile: Criminal Usury
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
422 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 36 
chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy 
of a state which has a materially greater interest than 
the chosen state in the determination of the particular 
issue and which, under the rule of § 188, would be the 
state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective 
choice of law by the parties.96 
Under this approach, the law of the state chosen by the parties 
to govern their contractual rights would be contrary to a fundamental 
policy of a state that has a materially greater interest than the state 
chosen between the parties in a contract.97  
A court considers many factors when determining if a state has 
a substantial relationship to a transaction.  In applying the substantial 
relationship approach, New York follows the Restatement (Second) of 
Conflicts of Law’s significant relationship test.98  In New York, the 
factors considered in determining which state has a substantial 
relationship to a transaction are: (1) the place of contracting, (2) the 
place of negotiation of the contract, (3) the place of performance, (4) 
the location of the subject matter of the contract, and (5) the domicile, 
residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of 
the parties.99  The courts are to evaluate the contacts according to their 
relative importance concerning the issue in question.100 
New York courts generally enforce choice-of-law clauses.101  
The New York Court of Appeals addressed the substantial relationship 
approach and held that “while the parties’ choice of law is to be given 
heavy weight, the law of the state with the ‘most significant contacts’ 
is to be applied.”102  In a contract between parties, New York law 
should apply, even if there is a choice-of-law provision electing 
 
96 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 (1971). 
97 AM. Equities Grp., Inc. v. Ahava Dairy Prods. Corp., No. 01 Civ.5207 (RWS), 2004 WL 
870260, at *1, *8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2004)  
98 47 C.J.S. Interest & Usury § 182. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Glen Banks, New York Practices Series: New York Contract Law § 8:3 (2009).  In the 
absence of fraud or violation of a fundamental state policy, New York courts generally defer 
to the choice-of-law made by the parties in their contract. Choice-of-law provisions are usually 
honored because the parties are free to reach an agreement on whatever terms they prefer.  Id. 
102 Cargill, Inc. v. Charles Kowsky Resources, Inc., 949 F.2d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1991) (ruling 
that New York law permits a court to disregard the parties’ choice-of-law provision in a 
contract when the most significant contacts surrounding the dispute in question are in another 
state). 
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another state to govern if significant contacts were in New York.103  
Moreover, when a state does not have a reasonable relationship to a 
contract between parties, and New York does have a reasonable 
relationship, then New York law should apply to the contract in 
question.104  A court may establish a reasonable relationship with New 
York if the parties negotiate and execute a financial instrument in New 
York, the parties to a contract performed under the agreement in New 
York, or the principal place of business for either party is in New 
York.105  In addition to the substantial relationship approach, New 
York “has a strong public policy against interest rates which exceed 
twenty-five percent.”106 
VII. NEW YORK’S FUNDAMENTAL PUBLIC POLICY AND ITS 
EFFECT ON CONTRACT PROVISIONS 
States have different views on whether the protections against 
usury represent fundamental policy.107  Some states, like New York, 
disregard choice-of-law provisions of another state’s laws that permit 
higher interest rates or have no restriction on usury.108  The policy 
underlying New York’s usury laws is fundamental.109  Therefore, to 
permit loan contracts executed in New York State to be governed by 
laws of other states, which have chosen to not outlaw usury, would 
ultimately violate time-honored public policy.110  Contracts that are 
void due to public policy cannot become enforceable by estoppel.111   
In New York, for a policy to be fundamental, the policy must, 
in any event, be a substantial one.112  When it comes down to the 
 
103 AM. Equities Grp., No. 01 Civ.5207 (RWS), 2004 WL 870260, at *1, *9 (holding that 
because significant contacts were in New York, that New York law should apply, despite the 
agreement that New Jersey law would govern). 
104 Power Up Lending Grp., Ltd. v. Cardinal Energy Grp., Inc., 2:16-cv-1545 (DRH)(GRB), 
2019 WL 1473090, at *1, *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2019). 
105 Id.  
106 In re McCorhill Pub., Inc., 86 B.R. 783, 793 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
107 William B. Emmal, comment, Evading Prohibitions on Usury Through Choice of Law, 
9 TRANSLAW 6 (2009).   
108 Id.   
109 American Law Reports, Conflict of laws as to usury, 125 A.L.R. 482 (1940). 
110 Id. 
111 Harvard Law Review, EFFECT OF ESTOPPEL UPON A CONTRACT VOID FOR 
USURY, 19 HARV. L. REV. 454 (1906). 
112 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 (1971). 
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fulfillment and satisfaction of a contract, the parties’ expectations and 
considerations are not the only value of contract law. 
The chosen law should not be applied without regard 
for the interests of the state which would be the state of 
the applicable law with respect to the particular issue 
involved in the absence of an effective choice by the 
parties. The forum will not refrain from applying the 
chosen law merely because this would lead to a 
different result than would be obtained under the local 
law of the state of the otherwise applicable law. 
Application of the chosen law will be refused only (1) 
to protect a fundamental policy of the state which, 
under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the 
otherwise applicable law, provided (2) that this state 
has a materially greater interest than the state of the 
chosen law in the determination of the particular 
issue.113  
In New York, the courts will not enforce a choice-of-law clause 
when a state has a fundamental public policy that is impacted by the 
contract and has a greater material interest than the designated state 
that is addressed in the choice-of-law provision of the contract. 
New York has a fundamental public policy against interest 
rates from creditors that exceed twenty-five percent.114  Moreover, 
New York enforces its heavy stance on its public policy against 
excessive interest rates.115  This essential public policy is further 
bolstered by a ruling of the New York Supreme Court, where the court 
held that the choice of Illinois law would not be given effect in part 
because New York’s usury prohibition is a fundamental public policy, 
and therefore, trumps the choice-of-law provision.116  The court’s 
ruling in Clever Ideas, Inc. conforms with the New York Court of 
Appeals, which stated that it would not enforce a choice-of-law clause 
in a contract “when New York’s nexus with the case is substantial 
enough to threaten our public policy.”117 
 
113 Id. 
114 AM. Equities Grp., No. 01 Civ.5207(RWS), 2004 WL 870260, at *1, *8. 
115 American Exp. Travel Related Serv.’s Co., Inc. v. Assih, 893 N.Y.S.2d 438 (N.Y. Civ. 
Ct. 2009). 
116 Clever Ideas, Inc. v. 999 Rest. Corp., No. 0602302/06, 2007 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 9248, at 
*1, *2–4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. Oct. 12, 2007). 
   117   Cooney v. Osgood Machinery, Inc., 612 N.E.2d 277, 285 (N.Y. 1993). 
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Additionally, New York’s decision to criminalize interest rates 
exceeding twenty-five percent is further evidence that usury 
prohibition is a fundamental public policy.118  The courts in the Second 
Circuit have recognized that New York’s criminal usury laws represent 
an important and fundamental public policy that overrides a choice-of-
law provision.119  Even if the substantial relationship test with another 
state is satisfied, New York’s vital public policy reflected in its usury 
laws overrides the substantial relationship test, and New York law 
must apply.120  Generally, New York courts will enforce a contract that 
it does not deem criminally usurious under the laws of the contracting 
state or country or where the parties were to perform.121  Nonetheless, 
if there is a violation of a fundamental public policy that New York 
recognizes, then the loan will not be enforced and be deemed as 
void.122  
Therefore, a court will enforce the substantive law of New 
York when a borrower brings a claim of criminal usury surrounding a 
financial instrument against a lender, even if there is a choice-of-law 
provision that provides that another state’s law will govern the 
transaction between the parties. 
VIII. THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINALLY USURIOUS FINANCIAL 
INSTRUMENTS IN NEW YORK 
The New York usury laws apply to financial instruments, such 
as loans and forbearances.123  For a transaction to constitute a usurious 
loan, there must be two parties contracting (a debtor/borrower and a 
creditor/lender).124  Additionally, it must appear that the real purpose 
of the transaction was, on the one side, to lend or provide money or a 
 
118 Electric & Magneto Serv. Co. v. AMBAC Int’l Corp., 941 F.2d 660, 663 (8th Cir. 1991) 
(holding that the existence of a criminal provision is significant because the legislature would 
not allow a criminal law to be bypassed by the mere existence of a choice-of-law provision 
contained in a contract). 
119 Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC., 237 F. Supp. 3d 130, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (holding 
that New York’s interest in preventing criminal usury prevails over the choice-of-law 
provisions set forth by parties in a contract). 
120 Id.  
121 72 N.Y. Jur. 2d § 57 (2019). 
122 Id. 
123 See generally Orvis v. Curtiss, 52 N.E. 690 (N.Y. 1899); Bristol Inv. Fund, Inc. v. 
Carnegie Intern. Corp., 310 F. Supp. 2d 556, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that the defense 
of usury must be found upon a loan or forbearance of money). 
124 Donatelli v. Siskind, 565 N.Y.S.2d 224 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1991). 
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form of money at a usurious interest reserved in some form by the 
contract and, on the other side, to borrow upon the usurious terms 
dictated by the creditor/lender.125 
There are two situations where criminal usury may be utilized: 
prosecution and as an affirmative defense.  While prosecution of this 
crime is rare, courts have held that criminal usury is constitutional.  In 
People v. Fernandez,126 the court reasoned that: 
The statute is sufficiently definite so as to give a 
reasonable man of ordinary intelligence fair, 
unequivocal warning of what conduct is prohibited and 
what is required of him. Persons who engage in the 
business of making loans have sufficient intelligence in 
mathematics to know when the “rates” exceed the 
statutory limit and to therefore seek legal advice. No 
fundamental “sense of justice” will be denied 
defendants by subjecting them to prosecution under the 
statute.127 
The Fernandez court’s recognition of the criminal usury statute 
as constitutional is promising.  However, avoidance of a criminally 
usurious loan is not a question of constitutionality, but about lenders 
being held accountable for their intentional actions and freeing 
borrowers from the shackles of usurious loans.  Courts should 
explicitly void criminally usurious loans. 
For prosecution purposes, a lender charging usurious interest 
on a loan is elevated to criminal usury in the first degree, a class C 
felony, when “either the actor had previously been convicted of the 
crime of criminal usury or of the attempt to commit such crime, or the 
actor’s conduct was part of a scheme or business of making or 
collecting usurious loans.”128  The New York Court of Appeals held 
that a “scheme” is “a design or plan formed to accomplish some 
purpose, and that ‘business’ means commercial activity engaged in for 
a gain.”129  The prosecution may offer evidence of usurious 
transactions not specifically alleged in an indictment for criminal usury 
in the first degree when an allegation states that the loan in question 
 
125 Id. 
126 402 N.Y.S.2d 940 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979). 
127 Id. 
128 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.42 (McKinney 2019). 
129 6 N.Y. Prac., Criminal Law § 19:15 (2019). 
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was part of a scheme or business.130  The Court of Appeals has held 
that when the plaintiff charges the defendant with criminal usury, that 
the defendant is “entitled to particulars as to the scheme or business 
allegation in order to know what he [will] be called upon to defend 
against.”131 
In transactions involving criminally usurious financial 
instruments, “the effect of the exaction of an illegal rate of interest 
differs under the various provisions of the consolidated laws which 
deal with interest and usury.”132  A criminally usurious financial 
instrument is null and void, and a court grants no equitable relief to the 
creditor executing the usurious financial instrument under the 
sovereignty of New York.133  A criminally usurious instrument is 
treated as a pretense in New York and is ineffectual as a source of 
obligation or right as a matter of law.134   
Further, in New York, not only is a criminally usurious 
transaction void, but a court also has the statutory power to declare any 
obligation or security taken by the lender in violation of the statute void 
as well, as a matter of law.135  In 2017, the Supreme Court of New 
York, Appellate Division, Second Department, recognized the 
applicability of General Obligation Law Statute 5-511 as an 
affirmative defense to a criminally usurious transaction, voiding the 
underlying transaction.136 
Further, any other transaction arising or stemming from a 
criminally usurious transaction is purged and treated as being null and 
void.137  The usurious nature of a contract or obligation is “to be 
determined as of the time it is entered into, and an obligation void at 
its inception for usury continues to be void forever, whatever its 
subsequent history may be, unless it is purged of usury.”138  In other 
words, when a party executes a contract, and the total interest exceeds 








136 Roopchand v. Mohammed, 62 N.Y.S.3d 514 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2017) (ruling 
that the defendants successfully met the burden of proving criminal usury and granted 
defendants’ cross motion for summary judgment, dismissing the action). 
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the contract was executed, and will continue to remain void and 
unenforceable.  Further, usury attaches to all consecutive obligations 
or securities that derive from the original usurious transaction, and all 
of those additional obligations are void.139 
IX. THE AMBIGUOUS AND UNRESOLVED RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN CRIMINALLY USURIOUS TRANSACTIONS AND 
WAIVER 
The issue of whether a party can waive its right to the 
affirmative defense of usury is a gray area that riddles the courts.  A 
waiver is “[t]he voluntary relinquishment or abandonment – express or 
implied – of a legal right or advantage.”140  An express waiver is a 
voluntary and intentional waiver of a legal right or advantage.141  A 
waiver may be implied by a party’s unequivocal conduct and actions 
that are tantamount to reasonably inferring the intent to waive a legal 
right or advantage.142   
The borrower may waive civil usurious transactions in a 
transaction under CPLR 3211.143 
At any time before service of the responsive pleading is 
required, a party may move on one or more of the 
grounds set forth in subdivision (a), and no more than 
one such motion shall be permitted. Any objection or 
defense based upon a ground set forth in paragraphs 
one, three, four, five and six of subdivision (a) is 
waived unless raised either by such motion or in the 
responsive pleading. A motion based upon a ground 
specified in paragraph two, seven or ten of subdivision 
(a) may be made at any subsequent time or in a later 
pleading, if one is permitted; an objection that the 
summons and complaint, summons with notice, or 
notice of petition and petition was not properly served 
is waived if, having raised such an objection in a 
pleading, the objecting party does not move for 
judgment on that ground within sixty days after serving 
 
139 Id. 
140 Waiver, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 CPTL Rule 3211(e) (McKinney’s 2006). 
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the pleading, unless the court extends the time upon the 
ground of undue hardship.144  
Thus, a party may explicitly or impliedly waive an affirmative 
defense through not pleading the affirmative defense or objecting to a 
claim on the basis of the affirmative defense. 
However, criminally usurious transactions cannot be waived by 
a party as an affirmative defense because New York has a fundamental 
public policy against the enforcement of criminally usurious financial 
instruments.145  While there is minimal law in New York to support 
this assertion, in Hammelburger v. Foursome Inn Corp.,146 the New 
York Court of Appeals addressed the waiver of a criminally usurious 
transaction.147   
In Hammelburger, the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate 
Division, Second Department addressed a situation where the 
defendant had first agreed in the contract to waive the usury defense 
expressly.148  Then, when the lender subsequently brought an action to 
enforce the contract in question after the defendant defaulted, the 
defendant failed to assert a criminal usury defense in its initial 
pleadings, amounting to an implied waiver.149  When the defendant 
moved to amend its answer to include the usury defense, the trial court 
denied the motion and granted summary judgment to the lender.150  
However, on appeal, the court vacated the trial court’s decision and 
reversed in favor of the defendant.151  The court held that “when a right 
has been created for the betterment or protection of society as a whole, 
an individual is incapable of waiving that right; it is not his to 
waive.”152  Aquila v. Rubio153 reinforced this point.  In Aquilla, the 
 
144 Id.  
145 American Law Reports, supra note 109. 
146 431 N.E.2d 278 (N.Y. 1981). 
147 Id. 





152 Id. at 360. 
153 No. 33561-12, 2016 WL 17161968, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., May 2016). 
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court held that a party could not waive its right to be safeguarded from 
criminally usurious loans.154 
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals in Hammelburger ruled that 
the transaction was lawful, even though the court deemed the 
transaction to be criminally usurious.155  Nonetheless, the New York 
Court of Appeals did not directly address the waiver issue presented in 
the case.156  Unfortunately, this ruling (and perhaps the somewhat 
unique facts of Hammelburger) has resulted in the courts viewing the 
waiver issue as unresolved, with the resulting patchwork of 
inconsistent rulings on the question of waiver.157  Nonetheless, Judge 
Cooke, who had ruled with the judges in Hammelburger, wrote a 
concurring opinion that discussed waiver and its impact on criminally 
usurious transactions.158  Judge Cooke stated that “[a] lender who may 
be criminally prosecuted for a particular loan should not be permitted 
to avoid the civil consequences of this wrong through the simple 
expedient of obtaining a waiver from the borrower.”159  He continued 
that as a matter of public policy, he would never hold that a criminal 
usury transaction was waivable outside a judicial proceeding.160  This 
concurring opinion served as evidence that even though the judges in 
Hammelburger ruled in favor of the lender, it was not because of the 
waiver being applicable against a criminal usury defense.   
While no case law directly addresses how a court should deal 
with criminally usurious transactions when there has been a waiver, 
the mere fact that New York has a fundamental public policy against 
criminally usurious transactions dictates that waiver cannot be used to 
estop a party from invoking criminal usury as an affirmative defense.  
 
154 Id. at *1, *6 (holding that “[a] party cannot waive his right to be protected from 
criminally usurious loans . . . [t]he right is not personal to the borrower, so as to be waivable 
by him . . . [t]he right exists for the benefit of everyone.”). 
155 431 N.E.2d 278 (N.Y. 1981) (ruling that grant of summary judgment for the defendant 
was improper). 
156 Id. 
157 See Hammelburger v. Foursome Inn Corp., 437 N.Y.S.2d 356 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 
1980); American E Group LLC v. Livewire Ergogenics Inc., 1:18-cv-3969-GHW, 2020 WL 
209903 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2020) (noting that while no final position was taken on the waiver 
provision in the engagement letter, the court noted skepticism as to the waiver provision in the 
engagement letter that stated “any conflicts shall be properly waived.”).  
158 Hammelburger v. Foursome Inn Corp., 431 N.E.2d 278 (N.Y. 1981). 
159 Id.  
160 Id. 
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“Litigants may waive rules of law or statutory provisions made in their 
favor, where no considerations of public policy are involved.”161 
Thus, if a lender raises waiver, either express or implied, to 
estop the borrower from asserting the affirmative defense of criminal 
usury, a New York court should allow the borrower to raise criminal 
usury as an affirmative defense because it concerns a fundamental 
public policy. 
X. INCONSISTENCIES AND LACK OF CONFORMITY BETWEEN 
FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS’ INTERPRETATIONS OF NEW 
YORK’S USURY LAWS 
Due to inconsistencies of statutory interpretation, the federal 
courts have inappropriately applied New York’s laws on criminal 
usury in dozens of cases.162  These decisions resulted in a wide range 
of differing opinions and judgments that are not consistent with the 
longstanding history of usury in New York.163  The only consistency 
found among both federal and state courts in New York is that they 
agree that the usury prohibition in New York reflects a longstanding 
and fundamental public policy of the state of New York.164  Through 
these inconsistencies of statutory interpretation, parties who have 
executed criminally usurious financial instruments seek to forum 
shop165 in order to evade the consequences of criminally usurious 
transactions in New York.166   
In In re Ventures Mtge. Fund, L.P.,167 the Second Circuit 
expressly flagged the question of whether a loan is void if it violates 
New York’s criminal usury statute without violating New York’s civil 
usury statute, as one that needed resolution by the New York state 
courts.168  The court speculated that, under a close reading of the 
statutory scheme, the voidance mechanism of General Obligations 
 
161 Stone v. Oneida Motor Car Co., 275 N.Y.S. 426 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1934). 
162 See supra note 109. 
163 Id. 
164 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Sullivan, No. 97-CV-9282, 1998 WL 575137, at 1, 8 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 1998) (holding that criminal usury is a fundamental public policy). 
   165 “A litigant’s attempt to have his action tried in a particular court or jurisdiction where 
he feels he will receive the most favorable judgment or verdict.”  Harvard Law Review, 
FORUM SHOPPING RECONSIDERED, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1677 (1990). 
166 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd., No. 97-CV-9282, 1998 WL 575137, at 8. 
167 282 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2002). 
168 Id.  
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Law Statute 5-511(1) might not operate to void usurious loans that 
only violated NY Penal Law Section 190.40 (i.e., the loans of $250,000 
or more described in section 5-501(6)).169  Notably, the court expressly 
acknowledged that it made no decision on the issue and that the 
question was framed “at some length in dictum because . . . this 
opinion might otherwise be misread to settle or foreclose the issue in 
the federal courts of this Circuit.”170  Despite that caution, the federal 
courts of the Second Circuit seem to have done precisely that.171  The 
courts seem to have even further restricted Section 5-511’s voidance 
mechanism to be inoperable as against any loan found to be criminally 
usurious, even loans for less than $250,000.172   
Many courts have applied General Obligations Law Statute 5-
511 to hold that all usurious contracts shall be void.173  As mentioned 
earlier, the New York Court of Appeals has confirmed that courts must 
deem a transaction involving a financial instrument void if it is 
usurious.174  However, many federal courts fail to void criminally 
usurious contracts relying on the reasoning that, unlike New York’s 
civil usury statute, Penal Law Section 190.40 does not explicitly serve 
to void instruments which violate it.175  As a result of this oversight in 
the drafting of Penal Law Section 190.40, some federal courts have 
chosen to hold that General Obligations Law Statute 5-511 does not 
void criminally usurious instruments simply because the criminal 
usury statute does not expressly provide as such.176  This significant 
discrepancy between the federal and state courts have caused various 
and different rulings on usurious transactions.  These discrepancies 
 
169 Id. at 190. 
170 Id. at 187. 
171 See generally Adar Bays, LLC, v. GeneSYS ID, Inc., 341 F.Supp.3d 339, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 
2018) (finding that In re Venture posited that there was, “no specific statutory authority for 
voiding a loan that violates the criminal usury statute.”); LG Capital Funding, LLC, v. Vapor 
Group, Inc., 17-CV-1297-NGG-SJB, 2019 WL 3437973, at *1, *10 (E.D.N.Y. June 27, 2018) 
(finding that the In re Venture’s non-voiding analysis would apply to a criminally usurious 
loan of $115,000). 
172 Id. 
173 See Roopchand v. Mohammed, 62 N.Y.S.3d 514 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2017); 
Donatelli v. Siskind, 565 N.Y.S.2d 224 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1991). 
174 Szerdahelyi v. Harris, 490 N.E.2d 517 (N.Y. 1986). 
175 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.40 (McKinney 2019). 
176 See In re Venture Mortgage Fund, L.P. 282 F. Supp. 3d 185 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding in 
dicta that nothing in Penal Law § 190.40 provides for voiding criminally usurious loans, and 
that it is uncertain whether the legislature intended such an effect based upon the language of 
the statute); American Equities Group, Inc. v. Ahava Dairy Prods. Corp., No. 01 
Civ.5207(RWS), 2004 WL 870260, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).  
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have led issuers of criminally usurious financial instruments to forum 
shop for a favorable court that would not void a criminally usurious 
financial instrument.  This judicial loophole of forum shopping 
ultimately leads lenders to evade the criminal usury laws enacted by 
New York and undermines New York’s legislative intent. 
XI. CONCLUSION 
All in all, when a transaction has been executed in New York 
between two businesses, the transaction should be governed by New 
York law if the transaction is substantially related to New York.  
Additionally, when parties execute a transaction in New York, and a 
court would violate New York’s fundamental public policy by 
enforcing a choice-of-law provision, New York law should govern the 
transaction.  If a borrower is unable to invoke criminal usury as an 
affirmative defense to an agreement due to a choice-of-law provision, 
the objective of protecting the public is frustrated and hindered.  
Further, a choice-of-law provision creates loopholes where a lender 
can side-step the substantive statutes and regulations of a state, setting 
a dangerous precedent for the future.  As a matter of principle and 
protecting the general public from loan-sharking, courts should 
evaluate choice-of-law provisions on a case by case basis, and when a 
choice-of-law provision in a contract conflicts with the public policy 
of another state that has a reasonable relationship, that forum state 
should govern the transaction in question. 
Finally, reconciling the statutory language concerning criminal 
and civil usury would be a big step to help clear confusion and 
ambiguity in contracts already in place and protect and avoid 
borrowers from paying a tremendous amount of interest that was once 
hidden usury on a financial instrument.  By reconciling the statutory 
language of criminal and civil usury, the federal court’s rulings on 
criminal usury cases will be consistent with New York State court’s 
rulings, and ultimately, in unison with New York’s legislative intent.  
Altogether, this will allow an approach to usury laws in New York that 
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